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GEORGE ROHANNA, ET AL., 
versus 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Cou,rt of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, George Rohann~ and . Charles Riddick, 
respectfully represent that they are aggrieved by a judgment 
and order of the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Number Two, entered on the 13th day of July, 1936, in a 
scire facias proceeding, whereby it was ordered that the Com-
monwealth have execution against the goods and chattels, 
lands and tenements of said George Rohanna and Charles 
Riddick for the sum of Two Thousand Dollars. 
A transcript of the Record in said proceedings accompanies 
this petition, and from it will appear the following facts: · 
FACTS. 
A chronological statement of the facts in this case will be 
conducive to clarity and to a correct comprehension of the 
questions involved. · 
On the 22nd day of April, 1935, one J. H. Montgomery 
swore out a "peace warrant" before a Justice of the Peace 
of the City of Norfolk against your petitioner, Ge.orge Ro-
r , 
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hanna, seeking to have the said Rohanna give surety to keep 
the peace to,vards said Montgomery. This warrant was issued 
under and by virtue of Section 4790, et seq., Code of Virginia, 
1930, and was tried by the Police Justice of the City of Nor-
folk on the 23rd day of April, 1935, with the result that on 
that date the Police Justice rendered a judgment requiring 
Rohanna "to give bond with sufficient surety in the sum of 
$1,000 for the term of twelve months from this date to keep 
the peace and be of good behavior towards all the persons of 
this Commonwealth". From that judgment Rohanna appealed 
to Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, No. 2. (See 
Transcript of Record, pp. 13, 14, for warrant and proceedings 
before Police Justice on the same.) 
On Friday, 1\Iay 31, 1935, this appeal of Rohanna from the 
judgment of the Police Justice came on to be heard in the 
Corporation Court aforementioned, and said Rohanna de-
manding and having been granted a trial by a jury, which 
brought in a verdict adverse to him in the following words: 
''We, the jury, find the accused guilty as charged in the 'var-
rant, and further find that he be required to enter into a 
recognizance in the penalty of $2,000, conditioned that he shall 
keep the peace and be of good behavior for the period of one 
year.'' A motion for a new trial was duly made on that date, 
and the hearing thereof continued until Saturday, June 8th, 
1935, when the Corporation Court entered an order in the 
following words : 
''This day came the defendant, ·who was led to the bar in 
the custody of the jailer of this Court, and also came the 
attorney for the Commonwealth, and thereupon the motion 
for a new trial, heretofore made on the 31st day of May, 
1935, having been duly heard by the Court, is overruled,. to 
which action of the Court in overruling said motion, the de-
fendant, by counsel, duly excepted. Whereupon there being 
some question as to the right of the defendant to demand a 
jury, the Court having heard all the evidence, doth find the 
defendant guilty as charged in the warrant, and doth affirm 
the judgment of the Police Justice pursuant to section 49:Z3- f 11( 
(really 4793) of the Code of Virginia, and doth require a 
new recognizance. The Court doth concur also in the ver-
dict of the jury and doth enter the same judgment as that 
found by the verdict of the jury. It is, therefore, considered 
by the Court, and the Court doth order, that the said George 
Rohanna be required to enter into a recognizance in the 
penalty of $2,000, with surety conditioned that he, the said 
George Rohawna, be of good behavior for the period of one 
year, from the 30th day of May, 1995, and that he be required 
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to pay the costs of his prosecution. 'Vhereupon, to the enter-
ing of the foregoing judgment, the defendant duly excepted. 
(Figures in parenthesis and italics in this paragraph sup-
plied.) 
"In default of the execution of the recognizance the said 
defendant is remanded to jail.'' (Transcript of Record, pp. 
8, 9, 10.) 
Under the latter part of the last judgment or order re-
manding Rohanna to jail, he remained continuously in jail 
until October 7, 1935; .that is to say, from June 8, 1935, to 
October 7, 1935, a period of four months, lack~ng one day. 
(Transcript of Record, p. 11.) 
On the latter date, October 7, 1935, Rohanna was brought 
into Court from the jail, where he had been continuously con-
fined for four months, lacking one day, and the following 
order and recognizance was entered on the records of the 
Corporation Court aforementioned (Transcript' of Record, 
p.ll): 
''Commonwealth v. George Roha.nna. 
"Threaten to kill J. H. Montgomery-On warrant appealed 
from the Police Justice. 
''George Rohanna, Johnson Court Apartment, who stands . 
convicted of threaten to kill, with Charles Riddick, 1019 I o/ 7 ~ 
Barney Street, as surety, were each duly recognized in the ( !;~-
penalty of $2,000, conditioned that the said George· Rohanna 
shall be of good behavior for the period of one year from 
~te, pursuant to a judgm.ent of this Court entered on. 
the 30th da;y of Ma;y, 1935, the said bond to remain in full 
force until the peri~d of one year shall have elapsed, or until 
it is otherwise declared void by order of this Court.'' (Italics 
supplied.) · 
Subsequently, on September 3, 1936, nearly a year after 
the entry of this order, it 'vas amended by an order which 
substituted for the date, 30th May, 1935, set out therein the 
date 31st ~fay, 1935 (Transcript of Record, p. 11), but as this 
nwnc pro tu,nc order is not material to the questions involved 
in and discussed in this petition for a writ of error and super-
sedeas, the very serious question of the power of the Court to 
enter the same will not be noticed or argued. 
On June 25, 1936, the Attorney for the Commonwealth 
moved the Court to declare the alleged recognizance of the 
7th October, 1935, forfeited on the ground that Rohanna had 
violated the conditions of the same. On this motion evidence 
'vas introduced to show that Rohanna had violat.ed the con-
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ditions of the recognizance in that on the night of Jwne 15, 
1396, three police officers of Virginia Beach had arrested Ro-
hanna in an intoxicated condition under an automobile; that 
he refused to come out from under the auto1nobile and they 
pulled him out; that he attempted to strike and kick them, 
and did inflict physical harm on one or more of them; that 
they handcuffed him and carried him to jail. Rohanna was 
convicted on the trial following this for being drunk and dis-
orderly and resisting arrest. (Transcript of Record, p. 12.) 
This was the entire evidence as to the violations of any of 
the recognizance. The Court thereupon, on the 29th day of 
June, 1936, declared such recognizance forfeited. 
It is importoot, indeed, essen.tial to a proper ~tnderstand­
i{ng oif the questions in this case, to note ccJiref1.tlly and t·o 
carry in the mind the faet that the only asserted breach of 
any of the conditions of the alleged recognizance occurred on 
the night of the 1·5th J~tne, 1936--more than a year after the 
c"lOth or 31st of May, 1935. 
· On the same day, 29th J nne, 1936, that the recognizance 
was declared forfeited,tlie Corporation Court issued a scire 
facias against your petitioners, George Rohanna and Charles 
Riddick, the surety in said recognizance, returnable to the 
Zth das of July, 1936, requiring them to show cause, etc., why 
the Coliimbnwea:rm: should not have execution against them for 
$2,000, etc., on the recognizance so declared forfeited by said 
Court. On the return day of the scit·e facias, petitioners ap-
peared and moved the Court to dismiss the proceeding·s, a.nd 
on the hearing of said motion, all the testimony and evidence 
heard by the Court on the motion to forfeit the recognizanc-e 
was again considered by said Court, and has been heretofore 
set out in this petition, and the same a.lso appears in the 
Transcript of the Record, pp. 8-14, inclusive, and p. 15. Having 
considered said evidence, the Court, on. the 13th of J ulx, 1936, 
entered judgment awarding the Commonwealth executiOn 
against your petitioners for $2,000, a.nd it is of this judg-
ment that your petitioners complain. 
ASSIGN~IENT OF ERROR. 
Your petitioners assign as error the judgment of the Cor-
poration Court of the City of Norfolk, Number Two, in award-
ing execution against them, as herein above set forth, on 
the evidence and facts before it and shown by the Transcript 
of the Record, and this constitutes the sole assig-nment of 
error by your petitioners. 
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FOREWORD TO ARGUMENT. 
We are not concerned here with the question of the power 
and jurisdiction of the Courts at con1n1on law to require 
of a person surety to keep the peace or for good behavior. 
Whatever that power and jurisdiction was, it does not ''seem 
to have been exercised to any appreciabJe extent in the United 
States. "-Note 90 A St. Rep., p. 797. 
In State v. Gould, 26 W. Va. 258, Judge Green discusses 
at length this power and jurisdiction at Common Law, and 
points out that- it had never been the practice in Virginia 
or West Virginia to exercise such common law power. 
The exercise of the power at common law was hedged about 
by safeguards. such as are inapplicable to our syste1n of 
Courts, and without such safeguards, the power and jurisdic-
tion would be contrary to our theory of government. F,or 
procedure in such cases at common law, see: Vol. 4, Black-
stone's Comm., Ch. 18, at pp. 252-3. 
For instance, at common law, although the time for which 
the accused was required to give bond for his good behavior 
or to keep the peace was to be fixed by the j~tdicial-not arbi- · 
trary discretion of the Court requiring the same, yet th~ 
order requiring such security had to show what such thne 
was, or it was a void order. 
In Pricket v. Greatrex, 8 Q. B. 1021, accessible in 115 Eng. 
Reprint 1159, Chief Justice Denman says as to this require-
ment of a limitation of time: 
"But there is nothing to remove the objection that the 
time for which the party stands committed in default of sure-
ties is left indefinite. Without some express limitation in 
the warrant, a poor man, who is unable to find sureties, may 
be imprisoned for life. The warrant here gives no limit but 
the finding of sureties; and this is a fatal defect. A limita-
tion of the time does not necessarily lead to the inconvenience 
that might be apprehended from the party being discharged 
at the expiration of it; for sureties might be again required, 
if the danger of a breach of the peace continued.'' 
The entire subject of requiring bonds to secure against 
a breach of the peace, for good behavi~r, etc., is no'v a mat-
ter. of statutory regulation in Virginia, and in view of the 
principle so clearly enunciated by Chief Justice Denmaii, 
it is not suprising that the statutes specify the. time for which 
such bond for good behavior, etc., shall be given. 
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ARGU1YIENT. 
The proceedings here against R.ohanna. were under Section 
4790, et seq., of the Code of Virginia. 
By Section 4789 power is given judicial officers, Justices 
of the Peace, notaries and comn1issioners in chancery, to 
require of persons not of good fame, bonds for good behavior 
"for a tertn not exceeding one year". This statute gives the 
jurisdiction and places a li·mit on the time. 
When complaint is made under Section 4790 of the Code of 
Virginia, as was the case here, the proceedings are before a 
Conservator of the Peace; under Section 4791 of the Code, 
which prescribes that when a. recognizance is requjred there-
under and not given, the person proceeded against shall be 
comn1itted to jail by warrant, "stating the sum. a·nd time in 
and for which the recognizance ·is directed". By the language 
just quoted and italicized, it is made imperative that not only 
the sum (or amount) in 'vhich the recognizance is to ~ taken, 
but also "the time in and for which the recognizance" is 
to be given must be set out in the judgment or order directing 
it. Any idea that the Court or Conservator of the Peace 
could require a recognizance without stating such sum or such 
time is beyond all reason and preposterous. Indeed, it may 
be demonstrated, W·e believe, that 4789 and 4791-in fact, all 
the sections of Chapter 189 of the Code-should be read in 
pari materia, and that so reading them any recognizance re-
quired under Section 4791 must be limited to a term not ex-
ceeding one year. But .inas1nuch as the recognizance required 
in this case was conditioned for Rohanna. 's good behavior 
for the period of one year from the 30th day of Ma.y, 1935, 
the question does not arise in this case and need not be con-
sidered or further noticed. 
From the statement of facts made in this petition, sus-
tained a.s they are in every particular by the record in this 
case, the following epitome will be hel:pful: 
22nd April, 1935: Rohanna arrested on a ''peace warrant'' 
for threatening the life of 1\iontgomery. 
23rd April, 1935: Roha.nna tried in Police Court on such 
warrant and required to give peace bond in $1,000, condi-
tioned to keep peace and be of good behavior for hvelve months 
from date. Appeal by Rohanna from judg1nent of Police 
Court. 
31st May, 1935: Appeal of Rohanna heard in Corporation 
Court, No. 2, with trial by jury. Verdict tha:t Rohanna be. 
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required ''to enter into a recognizance in the penalty of 
$2,000, conditioned that he shall keep peace and he of good 
behavior for the period of one year". ~lotion for new trial 
made and continued. 
8th June, 1935: ~lotion for new trial overruled; verdict 
of jury affirmed by Court; independent finding by Court con-
forming with verdict of jury. Judgment by Court that' Ro-
hanna "enter into recognizance in the penalty of $2,000, with 
surety conditioned that he, the said Rohawna, be of good be-
havior for the period of o1~e year from the 30th day of 1.1 aAJ, 
1935", etc. Remand of.Rohanna to jail for failur-e to furnish 
such recognizance. 
Here we have the complete proceedings against Rohanna 
from the inception of the warrant to the final j1tdg·ment there-
in by the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, Number 
Two. Nothing remained to be done in this case, and nothing 
more could legally have be-en done, the judgment being a 
final judgment, except the carrying into effect of said judg-
ment by Rohanna 's entering into the recognizance required 
thereby or the release by the Court of Rohanna under Section 
4794 of the Code of Virginia. The Court had adjourned the 
term at which the judgment was entered long prior to Octo-
ber 7, 1935, and the judgment fixing the time for which the 
recognizance was to be given and in 'vhat sum was then no 
longer in the breast of the Court or in fieri. The maxim, 
"Transit in rem j~tdicatam" applied. No change could be 
made in it or in the penalty required by it to be paid or 
suffered. No change in the requirements of the judgment 
could be effected in any way or under any guise, after the judg-
ment had become :final-after it had tbecome re·m j1tdicata1n; 
certainly no order could be entered requiring more rigorous 
tern1s of Rohanna in the recognizance than the final judgment 
itself required ; an order requiring more rigorous terms than 
the final judgment 'vould be void. The principle of law appli-
c·able to such a situation is well settled. 
In 16 Corpus Juri's., p. 1315, section 3099, is found the fol-
lowing: 
''When the Court adjourns for the term after sentencing 
one convicted of a crime, it thereby loses all jurisdiction of 
the cause. Therefore, after the term is passed at which the 
original sentence was imposed, the Cou1·t has, as a general 
rule, no power to modify, amend, or reverse it, partic~ltlarly 
if the new punish1nent is in excess of the original sentence." 
(Italics supplied.) 
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In Pifer's Case, 14 Gratt. 710, the head note is as follows: 
"On a prosecution for a misdemeanor, there is a verdict 
against defendant for a fine, and the Court enters up a judg-
tnent thereon for the fine and costs, and directs a capias ad 
au.diendu1n against the de~endant; and a.t a subsequent term 
r-:entences him to six months imprisonment in the county jail-
The judgment for the fine and cosb~ 'vas final, and no further 
judgment could be rendered in the case. The judgment for 
the imprisonment was, therefore, error.'' 
Allan, president, says, inter alia: 
• 'I think when the judgment was rendered for the fine and 
the costs, it was final. 'l1he1·e was an end of the proceedings, 
and nothing ·ren~ained b~tt to enforce the judgment by proper 
process. After the tenn, it could not be modified or added to 
or altered by the Court; and if erroneous, the defendant's 
remedy was in a court of error.'' 
See also: Note 28 (1913 C.), Anno. Cas. 280. 
As said in 16 Corpus Juris., supra., when the judgment 
became final, the Court "lost all jurisdiction of the cause"; 
it could make no further order changing the terms of the 
recognizance required by that judgment; its authority was 
lii¢ted to carrying out that judgn1ent by taking the recog-
nizance required by it a.nd not s01ne other recog'nizance in 
more rigo1·ous terms or with harsher require·ments. 
Despite this well settled principle of law, the Corporation 
Court, after the final judgn1ent aforesaid, to-"rit: on October 
7, 1935, entered the order and recognizance hereinbefore set 
forth as entered on that date. As the question involved here 
rests entirely on the validity or invalidity of this order and 
recognizance or on its proper construction and effect, it 'viii 
not be amiss to again set it out ve·rbat·i1n. It is as follows: 
''Commonwealth v. George Rohanna. · 
"Threaten to kill J. H. 1\{ontgomery-On 'varrant appealed 
from the Police' Justice. 
. ''George Rohanna, Johnson Court Apartment, 'vho stands 
convicted of threaten to kill, with Charles Riddick 1019 
Barney Street, as surety, were each duly recognized in the 
penalty of. $2,000, conditioned that the said George Rohanna 
shall be of good behavior for the period of one year frorn this 
date, pursua.nt to a judgment of this Cou.rt entered on the 
30th (31st) day of May, 1935, the said bond to remain in full 
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force until the period of one year shall have elapsed or until 
it is otherwise declared void by order of this Co~u·t. (Figures 
in parenthesis and italics supplied.) 
If this recognizance and order is, under a proper construc-
tion of it, to be deemed a recognizance, conditioned to be of 
good behavior for one year {ro1n the date of its ent·ry, October 
7, 1935, then it is, under the principle of law, set forth and 
emphasized above, a void order and recognizance, because be-
yond the power and jurisdiction of the Court; it constituted 
an alteration and change by the Court in the final judg1nent 
entered in the case against Rohanna on the 8th of June, 1935, 
whereby it was adjudged that the recognizance should be con-
ditioned that "the said Rohanna be of good behavior for the 
period of one year fron~ the BOth day of lJ1a.y, 1935". One yea1· 
from October 7, 1935, is a very different duration of time from 
"one year fron~ the 30th day of May, 1935". Rohanna had 
already suffered imprisonn1ent for four months, less one day, 
of the year, for which, by the final j·zulg·ment, he had been 
required to give surety for good behavior; that is to say, he 
had already been of ''good behavior'' for four months of said 
time, and there is no contention to the contrary. It makes no 
difference that that ''good behavior'' may have been through 
"duress of imprisonment". The fact of "good behavior" for 
approximately four months of the specified year for which 
such "good behavior" was required of him by the final judg-
ment remains a fact. The Corporation Court had no authority, 
right, or jurisdiction to extend the year fixed, specified and 
particularized by the final j~tdgme·nt to four months beyond 
the expiration of said year because during said four months 
Rohanna had been confined in jail; indeed, the four months' 
imprisonment, during which he was confined, should have 
been deemed the equivalent of a recognizance during said 
time, for it resulted from and was exacted because of his 
inability to give a recognizance during the currency of such 
imprisonment. To extend the year fixed by the final judgment 
by four months, less one day, 'vas, in effect, simply adding 
four months', less one day, imprisonment to a judgment which 
required only a recognizance for a certain definite, ascer-
tained, immutable time. Suppose eleven months of the fixed 
and definitely designated year had elapsed before Rohanna 
was able to give r-ecognizance with surety and that he had 
remained in jail that eleven months, can it be pretended that 
the Court would have had authority to require a recognizance 
under this final judgment for good behavior for one year from 
the end of the eleventh month of the designated and definitely 
det-ermined year? The answer to this query is palpable and 
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just as obvious and manifest as the answer to the question 
we are discussing. 
There can be no doubt of the fact that the order and recog-
nizance of October 7, 1935, constituted a material alteration 
and change of the final judgment of June 8, 1935, and that it 
added to and increased the 1~ena.lty fixed by said final judg-
rnent. This is beyond the authority and. jurisdiction of any 
Court, and cannot be accomplished in any guise or mode what-
soevet:. It is a void order, and all acts done under it are void. 
Some suggestion was made in the trial Court that, under 
Section 4 794, Code of Virginia, the Court had a right to 
make the order of October 7, 1935. That section reads as 
follows: 
''Any person committed to jail under this chapter may 
be discharged by the circuit court of the county or corporation 
court of the corporation on such terms as it may deem reason-
able." 
It is perfectly plain that there is nothing in this suggestion 
which can sustain the order of October 7, 1935. In the first· 
place, the order of October 7, 1935, was not an order discharg-
ing Rohanna. It was simply an order and recognizance recog-· 
nizing Rohanna and his surety; it said nothing about the dis-
charge of R.ohanna, nor did it fix any terms of discharge; 
indeed, it recited that it was a recognizance "pursuant to a 
judgment of this Court ente·red on the 30th day of JYI ay, 
1935", that is to say, pursuant to the verdict of the jury. ·Ro-
hanna was never discharged by the Court or otherwise from 
the necessity of entedng into the recognizance required of 
him by the final judgment in the case against him, and no 
terms for such discha'rge were ever made by the Court. There 
was evidently no thought in the mind of the Corporation 
Court when it entered the order and took the purported recog-
nizance of October 7, 1935, that it was discharging the prisoner 
under Section 4794 of the Code; on the contrary, it thought 
it was simply engaged in taking a recognizance theretofore 
required in the case, however erroneous its action may have 
been in such endeavor. The order of October 7, 1935, was 
not made under Section 4794, and did not purport to be made 
under such Section. The suggestion that it was so made 
is simply an afterthought in an attempt to save a hopeless and 
irremediable situation. 
Again the purpose of Section 4794 was to relieve a person 
in the· situation of Rohanna from too harsh imprisonment from 
his i;nability to furnish a proper recognizanee with surety or, 
perhaps, to lessen the amount of such recognizance; it was 
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certainly never intended to give the Court authority to in-
crease the penalty fixed by· the final judgnwnt, either by in-
creasing the amount of the recognizance or by lengthening 
the time fixed for "good behavior". A person situated as 
Rohanna would be entitled absolutely under the final judg-
ment to his freedom at any moment that he furnished the 
recognizance required by such final judgment, and no court 
could deprive him of this right by pretended action under 
Section 4794, requiring, as ''terms of his discharge'', a dif-
ferent and more rigorous recognizance. Yet the result of 
the contention that the order of October 7, 1935, could be 
made under Section 4794, is that the Court could so deprive 
Rohanna of this absolute right. It is a far-fetched, unsus-
tainable claim, and 've shall not notice it further. 
The conclusion on this phase of the argument is that the 
alleged recognizance taken on October 7, 1935, is eithe1~ totally 
void or void to the extent that it is conditioned on good be-
havior after May 30 or J\.Iay 31, 1936, because it was a recog-
nizance unauthorized and beyond the power and jurisdiction 
of the Court to take. 
See Note 34 A. L. R. 612. 
THE QUESTION IN ANOTHER VIEW. 
It appears from the uncontroverted facts in this case that 
the final judgmen,t of June 8, 1935, authorized and directed a 
recognizance by Rohanna, with surety in the penalty of $2,000, 
''conditioned that he, the said Roha.nna., be of good behavior 
for the period of one year from the 30th day of May, 1935". 
It next appears that the alleged recognizance tal{en under' 
this final judgment on October 7, 1935, was conditioned that 
said George Rohanna. shall be of good behavior for the pe1·iod 
of one year from this date (October 7, 1"935), pursuant to a 
judgment of this Court entered on the 30th day of lVIay, 1935. 
The Commonwealth construes this recognizance as being for 
"good behavior" for one year from October 7, 1935. So con-
strued it was not the recognizance required by the final judg-
ment of June B, 1935, a;nd ~cas not in confortnity with suchJ 
final judgment, and was for that reason also absolutely void. 
In Merced County v. Shaffer (Cal.), 180 Pac. 342, head notes 
2, 3 and 4 are as follows: 
'' 2. Bail bOnd given pursuant to o_rder providing that each 
of the two defendants be admitted to bail in the sum of $500, 
but purporting to be on behalf of both, and providing that if 
the conditions were not performed one or both of the princi~ 
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pals would pay the state the smn of $1,000, held defective and 
void as obligating the sureties, if at all to pay the sum if 
either or both of their principals failed to appea1·. 
'' 3. The bail hond in a crilninal proceeding is purely statu-
tory, and must conform to the statute and the order of the 
Court, not being good as a eommou law obligation, if it fails 
to do so. 
'' 4. A bail bond in a sum g1·eater than the order of the 
Court is absolutely void." 
Burnett, J., inter alia, says: 
"Neither is it disputed that a bond in a sum greater than 
the order of the Court is absolutely void. Roberts v. State, 
a4 ICan. 151, 8 Pac. 246. 
"United States v. Goldstein's Sureties (Dill R. 413), Fed. 
Cas. No. 15, 226, is a leading case in which a person was 
arraigned before a United States commissioner upon two 
separate charges. The c01nmissioner ordered him to bail in 
the sum of $500 on one charge and $200 on the other. One 
bond for $700 'vas taken. Defendant failed to appear, and 
the bond was forfeited. The Court said: 
" 'Bonds or recognizances of this character are binding 
only when taken in pursuance of law and the order of a 
competent court or officer. No order was 'made a'ltthorizin,q 
a single bond for $700, and the bond taken was a substantial 
deparl'ltre fro?n the bonds reqru,ired by the commissioner, and 
was not, therefore, obligatory on the sureties. State v. Buffa1n, 
2 Frost (22 N. H.) 267. Judgment accordingly.' (Italics 
ours.) 
"In the Roberts case the Supreme Court of I{ansas held 
that-
'' 'Where the district court directs bail to be taken in the 
penalty of $1,200, and the sheriff 1;equires and accepts from 
the principal and his sureties a bond in the sum of $1,250, 
the bond is utterly void, as the sheriff is only authorized 
to require bail in such an an1ount as directed by the Court.' 
''The bond exeeuteti by the defendants herein was, there-
fore, not only not binding upon them because they did not 
agTee to pay anytl1ing themselves, but it 'lvas absolutely void 
because it was in an a?noun.t in excess of the order of the 
Court." (Italics ours.) 
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And so here the recognizance was void because of the ex-
cess of time named in it during which good behavior was re-
quired beyond tha.t fiXed by the final j-udgmen-t under which 
the recognizance was given, and by 'vhich the conditions 
thereof were judicially and definitely determined. 
STILL ANOTHER ·viEW OF THE QUESTION. 
It is possible to construe the recognizance taken in this 
case as a valid recognizance for the good behavior of Rohanna 
for "one year from the 30th day of May, 1935", so as to bring 
it under the terms of the final judgn~ent requiring a. recog-
nizance so conditioned to be given. It will be noticed that the 
recognizance- is expressed on its face as being ''pursuant to a 
judgment of this court entered on the 30th day of May, 1935 ". 
By disregarding the other conditions of said recognizanee 
!l.S surplusage, a. construction might possibly be given it which 
would result in its being held a valid recognizance for good 
behavior for ''one year from the 30th day of May, 1936''. 
There are many cases in which conditions in bonds and 
recognizances exceeding the legal requirements have been held 
surplusage, and the same held good to the extent of the legal 
requisites. See collection of authorities in: 
Note L. R. A. (1917 B) 990, and especially p. 994. 
It will be remembered that we declare that such a construc-
tion is possible; we do not wish to be understood, however, 
as thinking it would be a proper construction in this case or 
as arguing to that end. 
Howbeit, that construction would not aid the Common-
wealth in this case, because the only breach of the good be-
havior of Rohanna shown in the evidence or contended for · 
occurred on June 15, 1936, a date beyond a year from the 
30th of May, 1935, during which latter time only was there 
any requirement for good behavior by the final judgment of 
June 8, 1935. 
RECAPITULATION. 
We trust we ha.ve demonstrated in this case the following 
propositions: 
(1) The alleged recognizance taken on October 7, 1935, was 
beyond the power, and authority, and jurisdiction of the Court. 
It, in effect, changed, modified and altered the final ju,d,qment 
of June 8, 1935, as to the terms and conditions of the recog-
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nizance, and in lieu thereof substituted a more rigorous and 
stringent recognizance. The recognizance exacted on October 
7, 1935, was, therefore, a void and invalid recognizance be-
cause taken without authority and with no jurisdiction to 
take the same. 
We wish to add at this place that the recognizance could 
not, under such circumstances, have any effect as a common 
law bond, nor would the principle of estoppel apply as against 
your petitioners. See overwhelming authorities to this effect 
in: 
Note 34 A. L. R. 612. 
2. That the recognizance was void on the ground that it 
did not conform to the final judg1nent of June 8, 1935, by 
which it was required, but, on the contrary, was more rigorous 
and exacting in its conditions. 
To the authority cited to sustain this proposition we add 
the following : 
In 6 Corpus Juris., p. 992, Section 227, it is said: 
"Where the authority under which a bond or recognizance 
is taken is conferred by a judicial order or 'varrant, sucl1 
authority must be strictly pursued, and a bond or a recog-
nizance taken thereunder which does not substantially con-
form to the prescribed conditions is without authority and 
void.'' (Italics ours.) 
3. That even if the recognizance could possibly be construed 
as a good recognizance, conditioned on Rohanna 's good be-
havior for one year from l\{ay 30, 1935, in accordance with 
. the requirement of the final judg1nent of June 8, 1935, it would 
avail the Commonwealth nothing in this case, because there 
is no claim or contention and no evidence of any wrong be-
havior, illegal or otherwise, on the part of Rohanna until 
June 15, 1936, a date subsequent to a year from the 30th of 
May, 1935. 
PRAYER. 
For the reasqns that have been set forth, your petitioners, 
George Rohanna and Charles Riddick, pray that a 'vrit of 
error and su-persedeas may be granted them to the order and 
judgment aforesaid ; that said order and judgment may be 
reviewed and reversed and annulled, and that this Court may 
set aside the award of execution against petitioners and de-
George Ro;hanna, et al., v. Commonwealth of Virginia. 15 
clare the recognizance, on which such award was made, void 
and of no effect. 
COPY OF THIS PETITION DELIVERED· TO OPPOSING 
COUNSEL. 
Petitioners and their counsel aver that a copy of this pe-
tition was delivered to the Attorney for the Commonwealth, 
the opposing counsel herein, on the 7th day of October, with 
notice to him that on said date the petition and record in the 
case was :filed with and delivered to Hon. John W. Eggleston, 
one of the Justices of this Court, in the City of Norfolk, with 
whom said opposing counsel might, if so advised, file within _ 
the time allowed by law, any reply to this petition or reasons 
why the prayer of said petition should be denied that said 
opposing counsel might deem proper. 
·Counsel has transmitted to the, ·Clerk of the Supreme Court 
of Appeals at Richmond $1.40, the filing fee in this ~ase. 
DESIRE TO BE HEARD ORALLY. 
Petitioners' counsel desire to be hea1:d orally on considera-
tion of this petition and the pray·er thereof. 
PETITION ADOPTED AS BRIEF. 
Petitioners hereby adopt this petition as the opening brief 
in their behalf in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
in this case. 
GEORGE ROHANNA and 
CHARLES RIDDICK; 
By: W. W. VENABLE and 
NATHANIEL T. GREEN, 
Counsel. 
W. W. VENABLE, 
NATHANIEL~- GR~EN, p. p. 
I, Nathaniel T. Green, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my 
opinion tl;te order and judgment complained of in the fore-
going petition should be reviewed and reversed and annulled. 
Given under my hand this 7th day of October, 1936. 
NATHANIEL T. GREEN. 
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Copy of the above petition reooived by me this 7th day of 
October, 1936, with notice that said petition and the record 
in the case was filed this day in the City of Norfolk with 
Ron. John W. Eggleston, one of the Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
JNO. M. ARNOLD, 
Commonwealth's Attorney in and for the 
City of Norfolk. 
Received Oct. 7, 1936. 
J. W. E. 
November 6, i936. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded 
by the court. Bond, $3,000. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
.VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Corporation Court of the City of Nor-
folk, Number Two, on the 13th day of July, 1936. 
Be It Remembered, That heretofore, to-wit: On the 7th 
day of October, 1935, George Rohanna was admitted to bail 
in the following words and figures, to-wit: 
George Rohanna, Johnson Court Apt., who stands con-
victed of Threaten to Kill, with Chas. Riddick, 1019 Barney 
St., as surety, were each duly recognized in the penalty of 
Two Thousand Dollars, conditioned that the said George 
Rohanna shall be of good behavior for the period of one year 
from this date, pursuant to a judgment of this Court en-
tered on the 3oth day of May, 1935 ; the said bond to remain 
in full force until the period of one year shall have elapsed 
or until it is otherwise declared void by order of this Court. 
And, afterwards, In said Court : On the 25th day of June, 
1936. 
This day came the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and 
also came the defendant in person and by counsel, and there-
upon the Attorney for the Commonwealth moved the Court 
to declare forfeited the recognizance entered into by the said 
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George Rohanna on the 7th day of October, 1935, on the 
ground that the said de.f.enda.nt had violated the conditions 
of the said recognizance, in that he had committed 
page 2 r a breach of the peace within the period of one year 
from the aforesaid date; and thereupon the whole 
matter of law and fact was submitted to the Court, and 
thereupon the said ~efendant, by counsel, and the surety 
upon the aforesaid recognizance, C. H. Riddick, by counsel, 
mov~d the Court jointly to overrule the motion of the At-
torney for the Commonwealth and also moved to quash the 
said motion, which motions having been fully heard by the 
Court, are overruled, to which action of the Court in over-
ruling said motions, the defendant and surety, by their coun-
sel, duly excepted; and thereupon, the Attorney for the Com-
monwealth tendered evidence to prove the breach of peace by 
the said defendant, and the said defendant and surety, by 
counsel, objected, which objections were overruled by the 
Court and the introduction of the evidence "\Vas allowed, and 
the Court thereupon took the matter of forfeiture of th~ said 
recognizance under advisement. 
And now : In the said Court on the 29th day of June, 1936. 
This day again came the parties, in person and by counsel, 
and also came the Attorney for the Commonw-ealth, and the 
Court having fully heard the arguments of counsel, doth here-
by order that the said recognizance be, and the same is here-
by declared forfeited, to which action of the Court in declaring 
the said recognizance forfeited, the principal and surety, by 
counsel, duly excepted. 
page 3 ~ The following is a copy of the scire facias issued 
pursuant to order of this Court entered on the 29th 
day of June, 1936 : 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
To the Sergeant of the City of Norfolk, Greeting: 
Whereas, George Rohanna, John Court Apt., and Chas. 
Riddick, 1019 Barney St., as surety, on the 7th day of October, 
. 1935, personally appeared before The Honorable James U. 
Goode, Judge of the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Number Two, of said City, and acknowledged themselves in-
debted to the Commonwealth of Virginia in the sum of Two 
Thousand Dollars, each of their respective goods and chat-
tels, lands and tenements to be levied, and to the use of the 
said Commonwealth rendered. 
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Yet upon condition, that if the said George Rohanna should 
be of good behavior for the period of one year from the 7th 
day of October, 1935, pursuant to a judgment of this Court 
entered on the 30th day of May, 1935, the said bond to remain 
in full force until the period of one year shall have elapsed, 
or until it is otherwise declared void by order of this Court; 
the said recognizance to remain in full force until the charge 
is finally disposed of, or until it is declared void by order 
of said Court. And should not depart thence without. the 
leave of the said Court, then the said recognizance was to 
be void, as by a copy of the said recognizance to 
page 4 ~ our Corporation Court, of the City of Norfolk, Num-
ber Two, transmitted and now remaining filed among 
the records thereof manifestly appears. 
And whereas, the said.George Rohanna hath failed to keep 
the peace for the period of one year as aforesaid according 
to the condition of the said recognizance as appears of record. 
Therefore, we command you, that you make known to the 
said George Rohanna and Chas. Riddick that they be before 
the Judge of our said Corporation ·Court, of the City of Nor-
folk, Number Two, on the 7th day of July, 1936, at 10 o'clock 
A. M., to show cause, if anything for themselves they have to 
say, why we may not have an execution against them for the 
sum of Two Thousand Dollars, of their respective goods and 
chattels, lands and tenements, to be levied according to the 
form and etfects of the recognizance. And have then and 
there this writ. 
Witness, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of our said Corporation 
Court, of the City of Norfolk, Number Two, at the Court-
house, the 29th d~y of June, 1936, in the 160th year of the 
Commonwealth. 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., Clerk. 
By W. H. IRWIN, D. C. 
page 5 ~ The following is the return on the aforegoing 
scire facias: 
Executed in the City of Norfolk, Va., this 29 day of June, 
1936, by serving a. copy hereof on Cha.s. Riddick, Geo. Rohanna 
IN PERSON. 
CHAS. E. FRANCIS, 
Sergt. City of Norfolk, Va. 
By H. L. GORDON, Deputy. 
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And later: In the said Court on the 7th day of July, 1936: 
Commonwealth 
v. 
George Rohanna and Chas. Riddick. · 
On scire facias for award of execution on forfeited recog-
nizance. 
This da.y came the surety, Chas. Riddick, by counsel, and 
moved the Court to dismiss these proceedings, which motion, 
having been fully heard by the Court, is overruled, to which 
action of the Court, in overruling said motion, the defendant, 
by counsel, duly excepted, and the Court took the matter of 
judgment under advisement. 
And afterwards : In the said Court on the 13th day of July, 
1936: 
The Court having heretofore on the 7th day of July, 1936, 
fully lieard the evidence and argument in the above 
page 6 ~ proceedings and having fully considered the matter, 
doth hereby order that the Commonwealth may have 
execution against the goods and chattels, lands and tenements 
of the said George Rohanna. and Chas. Riddick for the ~sum of 
Two Thousand Dollars, in the writ aforesaid specified, accord-
ing to the form and effect of the recognizance therein men-
tioned, together with the costs in suing fo~th and prosecuting 
this writ. Thereupon, the said defendants, by counsel, moved 
the Court to set aside its judgment in this matter and enter 
final judgment for the defendants and also to grant the said 
defendants a new trial, all on the grounds that the aforesaid 
judgment is contrary to the law and the .evidence and is with-
out evidence to support it, which motions, having been fully 
heard by the Court are overruled, to which action of the Court 
in overruling said motions, the defendants, by counsel, duly 
excepted. 
And thereupon the said defendants, by counsel, moved the 
Court for time in which to apply for a writ of error to the 
foregoing judgment, which motion, having been fully heard by 
the Court, is sustained, and the execution of the foregoing 
judgment is hereby ordered postponed for the period of sixty 
days. 
And now: In the said Court on the 3rd day of Septem-
ber, 19S6. 
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It appearing to the Court that in the order en-
page 7 ~ ter€d on the 7th day of October, 1935, the record 
incorrectly refer.s to an order entered on the 30th 
day of May, 1935, when in fact according to the record the 
order was entered on the 31st day of May, 1935, it is ordered 
that the aforesaid order of October 7th, 1935, be, and the 
same is ordered corrected in accordance with the fact was 
set forth in the record and it is ordered clone n~tnc pro tunc. 
To the entering of this order the defendant, by counsel, duly 
excepted. 
And again: In the said Court on the 3rd day of September, 
1936. 
This day came George Rohanna and Charles Riddick, by 
their attorney, after reasonable notice in writing to the At-· 
torney for the Commonwealth, of the time and place where 
and when the hereinafter n1entioned Bills of Exceptions \vould 
be tendered to the Judge of this Court, and \vithin sixty (60) 
days since the entry of the order herein on the· 13th day of 
July, 1936, and tendered their two bills of exceptions num-
bered respectively Number One and Number Two, and prayed 
that the same might be signed, sealed and made a part of 
th€ record in this case, and the same having been accordingly 
done, said Bills of Exceptions are hereby directed to be and 
are accordingly made a part of the record in this case. 
The following are the bills of exceptions referred to in the 
foregoing order : 
page 8 ~ Virginia : 
In the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, Number Two. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff, 
v. 
George Rohanna, principal and Charles Riddick, surety, De·-
fendants. · 
DEFENDANTS' BILL OF EXCEPTION, NU!1:BER ONE. 
Be it remembered that on the h€aring of the motion men-
tioned in the order of June 25, 1936, to forf€it the recog-
nizance of George Rohanna mentioned in said order, the fol-
lowing evidence was introduced and is all the evidence pro-
duced on said hearing : 
The following orders entered on May 31, 1935, June 8, 
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1935, and July 11, 1936, respectiv-ely by this Court in the 
case of Commonwealth v. George Rohanna, on appeal to this 
Court from the Police Justice of the City of Norfolk in a 
warrant charging the said George Rohanna with threatening 
to kill one J. H. Montgomery, that is to say: 
An order of' May 31, 1935, in the following words, 




Threaten to Kill J. H. Montgomery-On warrant appealed 
from the Police Justice. 
This day came the defendant, in person and by counsel, 
and also came the attorney for the Commonwealth, and there-
upon the defendant moved the Court for a jury to try the 
issue joined which motion, for a jury trial was objected to by 
the attorney for the Commonwealth, and which 
page 9 ~ motion having been fully heard by the Court is sus-
tained, over the objection of· the attorney for the 
Commonwealth. And thereupon the defendant, by counsel, 
moved the Court to quash said warrant, which motion having 
Leen fully l1eard by the Court is overruled, and to 
the action of the Court in overruling the motion to 
quash, the defendant duly excepted. And thereupon 
the defendant pleaded not guilty and thereupon a jury 
of seven lawful men, duly summoned, from which panel the 
Common,v-ealth and the defendant· each struck one, leaving 
the following jury, to-wit: G. G. Showen, R. W. Port-er, A. B. 
Buckwalter, G. Brock and J. P. Sadler, who were sworn to 
well and truly try the issue joined, and having heard the 
evidence and argument of counsel, return-ed a verdict in the 
following words: "We the jury find the accused guilty as 
charged in the warrant, and further find that he be required 
to enter into a recognizance in the penalty of $2,000.00, con-
ditioned that he shall keep the peace and be of good behavior 
for the period of one year". Thereupon, the said defendant, 
by counsel, moved the Court to set aside the verdict of the 
jury, and grant him a new trial, on the grounds that the said 
verdict is contrary .to the law and the evidence, the further 
'hearing· of which motion, is continued.'' 
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An order of June 8, 1935, in the following words, 




Threat-en to Kill J. H. Montgomery-On warrant appealed 
from the Police Justice. 
This day came the defendant, 'vho was led to the bar in the 
custody of the Jailer of this Court, and also came the attor-
ney for the Commonwealth, and thereupon the n1otion for a 
new trial, heretofore made on the 31st day of May, 1935, 
having been fully heard by the Court, is overruled, to which 
action of the Court in overruling· said motion, the defendant, 
by counsel, duly excepted. Whereupon there being some ques-
tion as to the right of the defendant to demand 
page 10 ~ a jury, the Court having heard all of the evidence, 
doth .find the defendant guilty as charged in the 
warrant, and ~oth affinn the judgment of the Police Justice 
pursuant to section 4973 of the Code of Virginia, and doth 
require a new recognizance. The ·Court doth concur also in 
the verdict of the jury and doth enter the same judgment as 
that found by the verdict of the jury. It is therefore con-
sidered by the Court -and the Court doth order that the said 
George Rohanna be required to enter into a recognizance in the 
penalty of $2,000.00, with surety, conditioned that he, the said 
George Rohanna, be of good behavior for the period of one 
year, from the 30th day of Ma.y, 1935, and that he be required 
to pay the costs of his prosecution. Whereupon, to the en-
tering of the foregoing judgment, the defendant duly ex-
cepted. 
In default of the execution of the recognizance the said 
defendant was remanded t.o jail.'' 
And order of July 11, 1936, in the following 'vords, 




Threaten to Kill J. H. Montgomery-On warrant appealed 
from the Police Justice. 
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It appearing to the Court tha.t in the Order entered on 
the 8th day of June, 1935, the record incorrectly refers to 
an order entered on the 30th day of May, 1935, when in fact, 
according to the record, the order was entered on the 31st 
day of ·:rvra.y, 1935, and it further appearing to the Court that 
in said order, June 8, 1935, that the said order incorrectly 
referred to section 4973, when in fact, the order should have 
referred to section 4793. It is ordered that the aforesaid 
order of June 8, 1935, be and the same is ordered corrected 
in accordance with the fact as set forth in the record, and it is 
ordered done nwnc pro t'Uifl.c. To the entering of this order, 
the defendant, by counsel, duly excepted.'' 
page 11 ~ And the Court doth certify that it appeared from 
the evidence that after the entry of said order of 
June 8, 1935, said George Rohanna remained continuously in 
jail because of his failure to enter into the recognizance re-
quired by said order until October 7, 1935, on which latter 
date the said George Rohanna· was released from custody 
and the following order and recognizance which was intro-
duced in evidence was entered in said appeal case. 
An order and recognizance of October 7, 1935, in the fol-




J,fonday, Octobe'l· 7, 1935. 
Threaten to !{ill J. H. Montgomery-On warrant appealed 
from the Police Justice. 
George Rob anna, Johnson Court Apartment, who stands 
convicted of threaten to kill, with Charles Riddick, 1019 
Barney Street, as surety, were each duly recognized in the 
penalty of $2,000.00, conditioned that the said George Ro-
hanna shall be of good behavior for the period of one year 
from this date, pursuant to a judgment of this Court en-
tered on the 30th day of May, 1935, the said bond to remain 
in full force until the period of one year shall have elapsed 
or until it is otherwise declared void by order of this Court.'' 
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An order of September 3, i936, in the· following words : 




Threaten to !{ill J. H. ~{ontgomery-On warrant appealed 
from the Police Justice~ 
It appearing to the Court that in the order entered on the 
7th day of October, 1935, the record incorrectly refers to an 
order entered on the 80th day of lviay, 1935, when in fact, 
according to the record, the order was entered on the 31st 
day of May, 1935, it is ordered that the aforesaid order of 
October 7th, 1935, be, and the same is ordered corrected in 
accordance with the fact as set forth in the record, and it ~s 
ordered done 'nJUI1l,C pro tunc. To the entering of this order 
the ·defendant, by counsel, duly excepted.'' 
page 12 ~ And there was introduced on said hearing also 
the following testhnony: 
CLARENCE :,3ARCO, 
a police officer of the Town of Virginia Beach, stated that 
he and two other officers arrested Rohanna on the night of 
June 15, 1936; that he was in a very intoxicated condition, 
but that he (the officer) believed tha.t Rohanna knew what was 
. happening; that when they·came on him, he was on the ground 
under an automobile; that he refused to come out from under 
the automobile on their request, and that they pulled him 
out; that he fought back at them; that he attempted to strike 
and kick them ; tha.t he did inflict physical harm on one or 
more of them; that they handcuffed him and put him on the 
floor of the· back seat of the police car and carried him to jail. ' · 
The Court asked the officer if the defendant Rohanna re-
sisted arrest and received an answer in the affirmative. 
ROHANNA 
took the witness chair and testified that he had been drinking 
but that he was not attempting to resist arrest; that the 
reason for his disturbance "\Vas that the officers claiD:ped the 
handcuffs on him so tight that they 'vere causing him severe 
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pain. He exhibited bruises on his wrists where the hand-
cuffs had been. The witness further stated that he was con-
victed for being drunk and disorderly and resisting arrest. 
And after considering the evidence aforesaid, the Court, on 
June 29, 1936, entered the order appearing in the record in 
this case. 
And the Court doth certify that to the entry of said last 
mentioned order the said defendants duly objected and ex-
cepted on the grounds that the ruling of the Court was con-
trary to the law and the evidence and because the Court had 
no jurisdiction to require the recognizance mentioned in the 
order of October 7, 1935, and because said recognizance so 
taken was void and of no effect beyond a date twelve months 
after May 30, 1935, and prayed the Court to sign, seal and 
make a part of the record, this their Bill of Exception, Num-
ber One, and the same is accordingly done. 
Dated this 3rd day of September, 1936. 
JAMES U. GOODE, (Seal) 
JA1\1:ES U. GOODE, Judge. 
page 13 } The following is a copy of the warrant and judg-
ment 'Of the Police Court, referred to in the order 
entered on the 8th day of June, 1935: 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
Whereas, J. H. Montgomery, 318 W. 35th St., of said City 
personally came before me, J. P. Holland, a. Justice of the 
said City, on the 22 day of April, 1935, and made complaint 
on oath that George Rohanna did on the 22nd ...... in said 
City Threaten to kill one J. H. Montgomery by reason whereof 
this complainant is afraid and has good cause to fear that 
the said George Rohanna will do him some grievous bodily 
injury, and therefore prays that he may be required to keep 
the peace towards him. And the said complainant also, says 
on oath, he does not make this complaint against the said 
George Rohanna nor require such surety of the peace from 
any ill will, hatred, or malice, but m·erely for the preservation 
of his person from injury. 
J. H. MONTGOMERY, Complainapt. 
Sworn to before me 
J. P. HOLLAND, J. P. 
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Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
To any of the Police Officers of the City to Execute : 
. · Forasn;tuch as J. H. Montgomery has this day complained 
qn oath before me, J. P. Holland, a Justice of the said City, 
· ·that George Rohanna of the said City, did on the 22nd day 
of April, 1935,, threaten to kill one J. H. Montgomery and has 
required surety of the peace ·of the said George 
page 14 ~- Rohanna, I command you in the name of the Com-
monwealth forthwith to appre:Qend the said George 
·Rohanna and bring him before the Police Justice of the said 
City, at the Police Court, in said City, to answer the said 
complaint. . 
Given under my hand and seal this 22nd day of April, 
1935. 
J. P. HOLLAND, J. P., (Seal) 
Upon hearing the evidence on the foregoing charge, the 
above mentioned accused is found guilty as charged in said 
warrant, and I do therefore adjudge that· he be confined 
in the Jail of the City of Norfolk for the term of ...... · ... . 
and do pay a fine of $ .. and $2.75 costs incident to said 
prosecution and conviction as provided by law. 
And I do further require that said accused do give bond with 
sufficient surety in the sum of $1,000.00 for the term of 12 
months from this date to keep the peace and be of good be-
ha.vior towards all persons of this Commonwealth. 
On motion of said defendant an appeal is granted to the next 
term of the Corporation Court of the City of 1\T orfolk No. 2, 
to-wit, the first Monday in May, 1935; and the witnesses above 
named were severally duly recognized in the sum of One Hun-
dred ($100.00) Dollars, payable to the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, for their appearance before said Court to give evidence 
on said charge, and not to depart hence without leave of said . 
court. 
Given under my hand this 23 day of April, 1935 . 
. R. B. SPINDLE, JR., Police Justice. 
Atty. JAS. WOLCOTT. 
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page 15 ~ DEFENDANTS' BILL OF EX!CEPTION, NUM-
BER TWO. 
Be it further remembered that when this case came on to be 
heard on the Scire Facias for award of execution on the for-
feited recognizance, the defendant, Charles Riddick, by coun-
sel, moved the Court to dismiss these proceedings as shown 
by the order in the record herein entered on July 7, 1936, 
and on the consideration of said motion, all the evidence .and 
testimony set forth in Bill of Exception, Number One as 
having been introduced on the motion to forfeit said recog-
nizance was again considered by the Court, but the Court over-
ruled the motion of said defendant as shown by said order 
and on July 13, 1936, as shown by the order entered in this 
case on that date, ordered that the Commonwealth have execu-
tion on said forfeited recognizance against the goods and 
chattels, lands and tenements of the defendants, to the entry 
of which said orders entered on July 7, 1936, and July 13, 
1936, respectively as shown by the record in this case, defend-
ants duly objected and excepted on the grounds that the ruling 
of the Court was contrary to the law and the evidence and 
because the Court had no jurisdiction to require the r.ecog-
nizance mentioned in the order of October 7, 1935, and bec~;tuse 
said recognizance so taken was void and of no effect beyond a 
date twelve months after May 30; 1935, and prayed the Court 
. to sign, seal and make a part of the record in this case this 
their Bill of Exception, Number Two, and the same is accord-
ingly done. 
Dated this 3rd day of September, 1936. 
page 16 } .Virginia : 
JAMES U. GOODE, (Seal) 
JAMES U. GOODE, Judge. 
In the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Number Two. 
I, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of the aforesaid Court, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing and annexed is a true transcript 
of the record in the suit of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
plaintiff, versus George Rohanna and Chas. Riddick, defend-
ants, lately pending in the aforesaid Court. 
I further certify that the said transcript was not made up 
and completed until the Attorney for the Commonwealth had 
• 
28 . Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
had due notice of the making of the same and of the intention 
. · pf the said defendants to take an appeal therein. 
, ~. . Given under my hand this 4th day of September, in the 
: · 'year 1936. 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., Clerk. 
· Fee for this record: $8.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C . 
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